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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 42569 
      ) 
v.      ) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2014-3684 
      ) 
DERRICK C. MILES,   ) APPELLANT'S 
      ) REPLY BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
 ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Derrick Miles appeals, contending the district court imposed an excessive 
underlying sentence on him.  The State’s primary argument in response is that this 
Court should dismiss his appeal based on the fugitive dismissal rule.  That argument is 
mistaken for several reasons. 
First, as Idaho Supreme Court has noted, fugitive status alone is not sufficient to 
justify the dismissal of an appeal, particularly where the defendant’s absence does not 
change the relevant facts or legal analysis of the issues on appeal.  That is the case 
here.  Additionally, the question of whether this appeal should be dismissed has already 
been addressed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order to conditionally dismiss the 
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appeal, which was resolved in Mr. Miles’ favor.  The State offered no argument in that 
regard, and so, re-litigating that issue, in the briefs or otherwise, is inappropriate.  
Furthermore, the State could not meet its burden to show dismissal is appropriate 
based on the proper appellate record in this case, and its motion to augment the record 
with documents not considered by the district court, as those documents were created 
after the relevant events, was improvidently granted.  For all those reasons, this Court 
should not dismiss Mr. Miles’ appeal.   
On the merits, this Court should grant relief because the record shows Mr. Miles’ 
sentence is excessive. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Miles’ Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an underlying sentence 
which exceeded even the prosecutor’s sentence recommendation and is excessive 
given any reasonable view of the facts. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Underlying Sentence Which 
Exceeded Even The Prosecutor’s Sentence Recommendation And Is Excessive Given 
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts 
 
 
A. This Court Should Not Dismiss Mr. Miles’ Appeal 
 
The State’s argument for dismissal of Mr. Miles’ appeal fails for several reasons.  
First, while it is within the scope of this Court’s discretion to dismiss a case pursuant to 
the fugitive dismissal rule, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, “the defendant’s 
fugitive status alone was not enough to warrant dismissal.”  State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 
712, 718 (2002) (citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993)).  The 
reason for that rule, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, is:  “Regardless of the flight, 
the appellate issues remained the same.  This Court can decide them as well following 
the flight as before.”1  Id.  As the State’s argument for dismissal is based solely on 
Mr. Miles’ fugitive status (see Resp. Br., pp.4-5), its argument fails under Nath.   
Apparently recognizing this problem, the State tries to distinguish Nath on the 
basis that the defendant in that case had been rearrested by the time of the appeal.  
(Resp. Br., p.5 n.3.)  That argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the Nath 
decision:  “This Court can decide [the issues on appeal] as well following the flight as 
before.”  Nath, 137 Idaho at 718 (emphasis added).  The Nath Court also explained 
                                            
1 The Idaho Supreme Court did note, “[i]n dicta, the [United States Supreme] Court said 
that a long escape might delay the proceedings enough to dismiss.”  Nath, 137 Idaho at 
718 (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 249).  However, in Nath, the defendant had 
been absent for three years, and that was not enough to justify dismissing his appeal.  
Id.  Mr. Miles was present for the sentencing hearing held on September 2, 2014.  
(R., p.51.)  Therefore, as of the filing of this brief, he cannot have been absent for longer 
than the defendant in Nath, and so, like Nath, the length of his absence does not justify 
dismissing his appeal. 
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that, while the primary challenge in that case was to the district court’s jurisdiction, 
“[t]hat court had ample powers to remedy the wrong that occurred, including 
consideration of the conduct in imposing sentence.”  Nath, 137 Idaho at 718.  As in 
Nath, Mr. Miles’ absence can be addressed by the district court when it addresses the 
pending motion for probation violation.  Therefore, as in Nath, the relevant facts and 
legal analysis on the issues raised in this appeal (i.e., Mr. Miles’ challenge to the initial 
imposition of sentence) remain the same regardless of whether it considers those 
issues before, during, or after Mr. Miles’ absence.  As such, the State’s attempt to 
distinguish Nath based on whether the defendant has been rearrested is mistaken 
because that fact is irrelevant to the analysis under Nath. 
Furthermore, the procedural history of this case demonstrates that the State had 
the opportunity to raise these concerns prior to the briefing, but chose not to.  Cf. 
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63-64 (2015) (explaining why re-litigation of issues 
previously decided in another action between the same litigants should be precluded).  
Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an order conditionally dismissing 
Mr. Miles’ appeal because “[t]his appeal has been suspended since December 29, 
2015, [sic] for the probation violation proceeding, and there appears not to have been 
any action in the District Court regarding this matter.”  (Order Conditionally Dismissing 
Appeal, dated February 24, 2016.)  As such, the Court indicated “the case should be 
dismissed, and a new Notice of Appeal could be filed upon resolution of the pending 
probation violation matter.”  (Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal.)  The Court also 
explained that the appeal would be dismissed “within fourteen (14) days unless a 
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response is filed showing why this appeal should not be dismissed.”  (Order 
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal.)   
Mr. Miles filed a response to that order, explaining such a dismissal would 
deprive him of the ability to challenge the district court’s actions at the initial sentencing 
hearing.  (Objection to Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal and Motion to Resume 
the Briefing Schedule, pp.1-2, file-stamped Feb. 26, 2016).)  The State filed no 
argument in regard to the order or Mr. Miles’ response.  And yet, the State now seeks to 
have Mr. Miles’ appeal dismissed on essentially the same basis as the order 
conditionally dismissing the appeal:  “[h]e subsequently failed to appear for his 
probation violation evidentiary hearing . . . .”  (Resp. Br., p.3.)  Given the particular 
procedural history of this case, it is inappropriate for the State to raise that issue now, in 
its Respondent’s Brief or otherwise.   
 
B. The State’s Motion To Augment The Record Was Improvidently Granted; A 
Review Of The Proper Record On Appeal Reaffirms That This Court Should Not 
Dismiss Mr. Miles’ Appeal 
 
The State’s argument for dismissal also fails because the proper record on 
appeal – namely, the documents considered by, and the arguments made to, the district 
court – does not indicate when or whether Mr. Miles failed to appear.  (See generally R.)  
That is unsurprising, since this appeal is only dealing with the district court’s decisions 
at the initial sentencing hearing, which occurred before any such absence allegedly 
occurred.  (See, e.g., R., p.51 (indicating Mr. Miles personally appeared at the 
sentencing hearing).)  As the party seeking dismissal of the appeal, the State bears the 
burden of showing dismissal is appropriate.  Since the record does not contain any 
information about Mr. Miles’ absence, the State’s argument in its Respondent’s Brief 
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fails to show that dismissal is appropriate in this case.  Cf. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 
430, 434 n.1 (2002) (noting that some portions of the respondent’s cross appeal were 
based only on documents which were not in the appellate record, and holding those 
arguments would not be considered pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(6)).  As such, its argument 
for dismissal should be rejected based on the proper appellate record.  State v. Moran-
Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 179 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that, where the record was 
insufficient to determine whether the defendant in that case was actually a fugitive who 
should be disentitled to his appeal, the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal would be 
denied). 
The State’s inability to prove its argument given the proper appellate record 
demonstrates one reason why the Idaho Appellate Rules have specific provisions for 
the filing of a separate motion to dismiss an appeal.  See I.A.R. 32(a); compare Moran-
Soto, 150 Idaho at 179.  One of those provisions allows for such motions to be 
accompanied by briefs or affidavits in support thereof.  I.A.R. 32(d).  However, the State 
has not filed such a motion in this case.2   
Rather than pursuing the path provided in the appellate rules, the State instead 
moved to augment the record with, or have this Court take judicial notice of, certain 
documents which it asserted would justify its argument for dismissal.  (Resp. Br., p.3; 
Motion to Augment the Appellate Record or, in the Alternative, Motion to Take Judicial 
Notice, and Statement in Support Thereof, file-stamped May 9, 2016).)  That motion 
was improvidently granted.  (Order Granting Motion to Augment, dated May 23 2016.)  
                                            
2 There are limits on when motions to dismiss may be filed.  See, e.g., I.A.R. 32(a).  As 
discussed in depth in Section A, supra, the State had the opportunity to raise its 
arguments in favor of dismissal pursuant to the order conditionally dismissing the 
appeal, but did not.   
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The Idaho Supreme Court has authority to review whether it erred in ruling on a motion 
to augment the appellate record.3  State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218 (2014).   
As Mr. Miles explained in his objection to that motion (file-stamped May 12, 
2016), the State’s motion was improper because it sought to augment the record with 
irrelevant information which had not been considered by the district court.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court has previously explained that documents which were not considered by 
the district court, particularly those which were not created until after the appeal was 
filed, “obviously . . . could not have been presented to the district court and could not 
have been included in the record had the Bank made a timely motion to augment the 
record.”  See, e.g., Western Community Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc., 137 Idaho 305, 306 n.1 
(2002) (emphasis added).     
Yet that is precisely the type of documents the State’s motion sought to augment 
into the appellate record – documents which had not been considered by the district 
court because the documents had not been created until after the district court’s 
decision.  Both of the documents the State asked to be augmented to the record were 
created on May 9, 2016 (see, e.g., Aug. p.2 (bottom right hand corner bearing the date 
the document was printed); Aug. p.8 (same).)  Furthermore, the information it asks this 
                                            
3 Mr. Miles appreciates the limitations which would exist in reviewing the order granting 
the motion to augment should this case be assigned to the Court of Appeals.  See, e.g., 
State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793, 795-97 (Ct. App. 2013).  However, even if that 
Court cannot address the propriety of the order augmenting the record, it should still, 
pursuant to its decision in State v. Morgan, consider only the documents before the 
district court in analyzing this case:  “The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying 
the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements 
of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which 
are properly made part of the record on appeal.”  State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621 
(Ct. App. 2012).  Accordingly, it should not consider the elements of the record which 
were not before the district court, such as the documents in the State’s motion to 
augment. 
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Court to consider is that Mr. Miles failed to appear for a hearing on December 3, 2014.  
(Resp. Br., p.3.)  However, the sentencing hearing at issue in this appeal occurred on 
September 2, 2014.  (R., p.48.)  The Judgment of Conviction was entered on 
September 15, 2014, and Mr. Miles subsequently filed his Notice of Appeal on 
September 26, 2014.  (R., pp.51, 54.)  Therefore, those documents were created after 
the district court made the decision challenged on appeal, and even the purportedly-
relevant information therein did not occur until after the events relevant to this appeal 
were concluded.  As such, those documents were not properly included in the record 
pursuant to a motion to augment the record.  Kickers, 137 Idaho at 306 n.1.   
As a result, the State’s motion to augment the record was improvidently granted, 
and a review of the proper appellate record reaffirms that dismissing Mr. Miles’ appeal is 
not proper in this case. 
 
C. The Record Shows The Sentence Imposed Is Excessive 
The State’s responses concerning the merits of Mr. Miles’ argument that his 
sentence is excessive are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in 
that regard.  Accordingly, Mr. Miles simply refers the Court back to pages 4-5 of his 
Appellant’s Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Miles respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.   
 DATED this 21st day of June, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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